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The prevalence of either Ricardian or non-Ricardian fiscal regimes is important both for 
practical policy reasons and to assess fiscal sustainability, and this is of particular 
relevance for European Union countries. The purpose of this paper is to assess, with a 
panel data set, the empirical evidence concerning the existence of Ricardian fiscal 
regimes in EU-15 countries. The results give support to the Ricardian fiscal regime 
hypothesis throughout the sample period, and for sub-samples accounting for the dates 
of the Maastricht Treaty and for the setting-up of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Additionally, electoral budget cycles also seem to play a role in fiscal behaviour. 
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The distinction between Ricardian and non-Ricardian fiscal regimes can be traced back 
to Aiyagari and Gertler (1985) who maintained that in a non-Ricardian regime, the 
Treasury would not commit itself in the future to match completely new government 
debt with future taxes, since some part of the new debt is to be financed through money. 
In a Ricardian regime, the opposite would be true, with future fiscal revenues being 
expected to pay for current outstanding government liabilities. In other words, in a 
Ricardian fiscal regime, primary budget balances are expected to react to government 
debt, in order to ensure fiscal solvency.  
 
On the other hand, in a non-Ricardian regime the government would determine primary 
balances independently of the level of government debt. Moreover, in the context of 
assessing the sustainability of public finances, satisfying the intertemporal budget 
constraint or being in a Ricardian fiscal regime is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition for sustainability.1 
 
The existence of either a Ricardian or a non-Ricardian fiscal regime is also relevant for 
practical policy reasons. Indeed, this closely relates to the commitment of the European 
fiscal authorities to keep government liabilities within bounds, in the spirit of the 
Maastricht Treaty and of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Nevertheless, applied 
work on the topic is far from abundant, and even less for countries of the European 
Union. This paper adds to the literature by assessing the empirical evidence concerning 
the existence of Ricardian or non-Ricardian fiscal regimes in the EU-15 countries, using 
an annual panel data set for the period 1970-2003.  
 
Given the institutional changes that occurred in the EU-15 in the 1990s, alternative sub-
sample periods are considered in the analysis to assess the possibility of fiscal regime 
shifts. Therefore, the analysis takes into account the ratification of the European Union 
Treaty in Maastricht on February 1992, with the setting up of the convergence criteria, 
as well as the adoption of the SGP framework in December 1996 in the European 
Council of Dublin, afterwards ratified in June 1997 in Amsterdam. The results reported 
                                                          
1 For a discussion of fiscal sustainability tests and review of empirical evidence see, for instance, Chalk 
and Hemming (2000) and Afonso (2005). 
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in the paper give support to the Ricardian fiscal regime hypothesis throughout the 
sample period. Additionally, electoral budget cycles also seem to play a role in fiscal 
behaviour. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section two addresses the 
discussion regarding fiscal regimes, and reviews some of the sparse related existing 
empirical evidence. Section three discusses the empirical specifications. Section four 
presents the empirical analysis of fiscal regimes in the EU-15 countries. Finally, section 
five contains my concluding remarks. 
 
2. Fiscal regimes 
 
2.1. The relevance of different fiscal regimes 
 
The classification of a fiscal regime as “Ricardian,” is inspired by the idea of a “well 
behaved” or “disciplined” government. Tax cuts financed by increased government 
borrowing should be matched by tax increases (or spending cuts) in the future in order 
to keep the present value of tax liabilities constant. This is essentially the implicit 
assumption of a Ricardian fiscal regime, pursued by a “well behaved” government.  
 
Under the terminology used by Sargent and Wallace (1981), a Ricardian regime can be 
labelled as a “regime of monetary predominance,” since money demand and supply 
determine in this case the price level.2 In addition, the non-Ricardian regime is labelled 
“a regime of fiscal predominance,” as prices would then be endogenously determined 
from the government budget constraint.  
 
In a Ricardian regime where the monetary authorities are “active”, the government has 
to attain primary budget surpluses in order that the budget constraint is consistent with 
repayment of the initial stock of debt at the price level resulting from the money 
demand equation. According to Leeper’s (1991) terminology, the Treasury has a 
                                                          
2 Sargent and Wallace (1981) assessed the effectiveness of monetary policy under a regime where the 
treasury sets budget deficits throughout time. Under certain circumstances, their simulations indicate that 
sufficient seigniorage cannot be generated to finance the continuous issuing of new debt if deficits are too 
big and persistent, and that “monetary predominance” in the present may lead to higher inflation in the 
future. 
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“passive” strategy and the monetary authority has an “active” behaviour.3 If the 
government chooses an active fiscal policy, that is, the budget surpluses are not adjusted 
endogenously in order for the budget constraint to satisfy the price level implicit in the 
money demand function then a non-Ricardian fiscal regime could be in place.4  
 
Within the theoretical framework of a regime of fiscal predominance, where consumers 
are non-Ricardian, wealth effects should show up through nominal government debt, 
with the government budget constraint being then used to determine a unique price 
level. More generally, the price level, P, could be determined by the intertemporal 




















Bt stands for the government nominal liabilities in period t, including the stock of public 
debt (for simplicity, one year securities) and the monetary base; st is the primary budget 
government balance in period t, including seigniorage revenues, in real terms; and r is 
the real interest rate, assumed constant, also considering the usual transversality 
condition, which needs to be met by a solvent government. In the framework of Sargent 
and Wallace, the intertemporal budget constraint would imply that the inflation tax is 
the residual that adjusts to meet the fiscal shortfalls. 
 
On the other hand, under such Ricardian fiscal regimes, and as Buiter (2002) recalls, the 
intertemporal government budget constraint would not be seen as a constraint but rather 
as a value equation. In that case, fiscal policy models would need a fiscal rule, for 
instance, making the primary surplus a function of outstanding government liabilities. 
This underlying rational is useful for the testable specifications of fiscal regimes 
proposed ahead in section three of the paper. 
 
                                                          
3 Davig and Leeper (2005) mention that “passive fiscal policy” occurs when the response of taxes to debt 
exceeds the real interest rate and “active fiscal policy” occurs when taxes do not respond sufficiently to 
debt to cover real interest payments. 
4 The proponents of the fiscal theory of the price level argue along these lines. See, for instance, 
Woodford (1994), Sims (1994), and Cochrane (1999) 
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2.2. Overview of previous evidence on Ricardian fiscal regimes 
 
Regarding the empirical validation of the existence of Ricardian fiscal regimes, some 
work has been attempted, predominantly based on univariate tests. Canzoneri, Cumby 
and Diba (2001) use a bivariate VAR to test for the existence of a Ricardian regime in 
the US. They assess if the primary budget surplus as a percentage of GDP negatively 
influences the government liabilities, also as a ratio of GDP. The government liabilities 
include both the public debt and the monetary base. In a Ricardian regime, the positive 
changes in the budget surplus should be used to pay back some of the outstanding 
public debt. One would then expect to see an inverse relationship between the primary 
budget surplus and government liabilities. They conclude in favour of the existence of 
Ricardian regime, with the Treasury assuming a passive strategy and the Central Bank 
assuming an active strategy.  
 
Cochrane (1999) also uses a VAR model with the following variables: public debt as a 
percentage of private consumption, the budget surplus-private consumption ratio, the 
consumption rate growth and the real interest rate implicit in the stock of public debt. 
With annual data for the US he concludes that positive changes in the budget surplus 
reduce the stock of public debt. Woodford (1999) reaches the same conclusions as 
Cochrane (1999), with the same data and variables, with the exception that the real 
interest rate is discarded on the basis that it should be implicit in the evolution of the 
other three variables (Woodford (1999)). 
 
Debrun and Wyplosz (1999) and Mélitz (2000) provide additional empirical work 
related to this discussion. They estimate reaction functions respectively for the UE-12 
and OECD countries, in order to evaluate if the primary budget surplus responds 
positively to the level of government debt. According to the results presented by these 
authors, there seems to be a statistically significant positive response of the primary 
budget balance to government debt. Consequently, they conclude that governments do 
take into account their respective intertemporal budget constraints. In other words, fiscal 
policy might have been implemented according to a Ricardian regime.  
 
Creel and Sterdyniak (2001) also adopt an approach similar to the one implemented by 
Mélitz (2000). With panel data and reaction function estimations, they mention that 
 7
fiscal policy could be characterised by a Ricardian regime in Germany and in the US, 
and by a non-Ricardian regime in France. Additionally, another possible reading of the 
results presented by these two authors might be the conclusion that fiscal policy may 
have been, in the past, sustainable in Germany and not sustainable in France.5  
 
Using a different approach for somehow related research, Favero (2002) jointly models 
the effects of monetary and fiscal policies on macroeconomic variables in structural 
models for France, Germany, Italy and Spain, and reports that fiscal policy reacts to 
increases in debt. Additionally, for the US, Favero and Monacelli (2003) and Sala 
(2004), report the existence of Ricardian fiscal regimes after the end (beginning) of the 
1980s (1990s), while Sala concludes for the existence of non-Ricardian regime in the 
1960s and 1970s. A Ricardian regime is also reported by Rocha and Silva (2004) for 
Brazil, a country where past high inflation and fiscal problems would have seem to be a 
good ground for fiscal predominance. 
 
Table 1 summarises a broader list of the main findings on empirical related evidence 
















                                                          
5 Afonso (2005) also reports fiscal policy sustainability results along this line. 
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Table 1 – Empirical evidence on Ricardian fiscal regimes 
Reference Data Methodology Results 
Bohn (1998) US, 
1916-1995 
VAR Positive reaction of primary surplus to 
(initial) debt ratio. Ricardian regime. 




VAR Positive changes in the budget surplus 








Primary budget surplus responds 
positively to the level of government 
debt: Ricardian regime. 





Primary budget surplus responds 
positively to the level of government 









The increase of government debt has a 
positive effect on the primary balances: 
Ricardian regime. 
Canzoneri, 




VAR Positive shocks in the primary budget 
surplus decrease the real value of the 








3SLS The fiscal surplus reacts positively to 
an increase in the debt ratio. Ricardian 
regime. 
Favero (2002) France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain, 1960-
2000 
SUR Fiscal policy reacts to debt increases. 
Ricardian regime. 








Cyclically primary deficits decrease 









Ricardian regime after 1986:3. 




VAR Debt reacts negatively to primary 
budget surplus. Ricardian regime. 
Sala (2004) US, 
1960-2001 
VAR Non-Ricardian regime in 1960-1979; 
Ricardian regime in 1990-2001. 
EC (2004) EU-11, 1970-2003 Panel data, 
instrumental 
variables 
Primary and cyclically adjusted 
primary balances react positively to 




14 EU countries, 
US and Japan, 
1977-2002 
NLLS Primary surplus reacts positively to 
debt. Ricardian regime. 
Bohn (2005) US, 
1792-2003 
OLS Positive response of primary surplus to 
initial debt. Ricardian regime. 
 
3. Empirical specifications 
 
The idea of implementing causality tests between the primary balances and government 
debt, which is implied in the VAR models mentioned in sub-section 2.3, is not without 
pitfalls. In fact, both these variables are part of the present value borrowing constraint, a 
constraint that in the end holds true in any fiscal regime, whether Ricardian or non-
Ricardian. Since I am specifically concerned with the set of EU-15 countries, another 
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strategy is to pool the data and use panel models along with some plausible testable 
assumptions. One of the advantages of using a pooled sample is that it allows the use of 
more observations and gives more degrees of freedom. Indeed, since for some countries 
the length of the time span could be a problem, country-specific regressions might offer 
imprecise estimates. Another advantage of a panel approach may be the reduction of 
multicollinearity among variables (see namely Hsiao (2002)). 
 
When thinking about government debt and fiscal balances, it seems pertinent to expect 
governments to attain primary surpluses if they want to downsize the stock of public 
debt. The underlying idea being that if fiscal authorities are motivated by debt 
stabilization and sustainability motives, a positive response of budget balances to the 
stock of debt should be expected. A fiscal policy rule where the primary balance reacts 
to the debt variable would be a possible avenue for such analysis. 
 
Therefore, the following linear dynamic model, closely connected to the fiscal budget 
account identity, could give a testable specification for the primary budget balance with 
the debt ratio as an exogenous variable and a lagged dependent variable, 
 
 itititiit ubss +++= −− 11 θδβ . (2) 
 
In (2) the index i (i=1,…,N) denotes the country, the index t (t=1,…,T) indicates the 
period and βi stands for the individual effects to be estimated for each country i. sit is the 
primary balance as a percentage of GDP for country i in period t, sit-1 is the observation 
on the same series for the same country i in the previous period, and bit-1 is the debt-to-
GDP ratio in period t-1 for country i. Additionally, it is assumed that the disturbances uit 
are independent across countries. 
 
The use of primary rather than total balances is justified by the fact that the 
intertemporal government budget constraint relates to the primary surplus. Moreover, 
the use of the primary balance is logical since primary expenditure is more easily under 
the discretionary control of the government. Under such a fiscal policy rule, one 
assumes that the primary balance of period t is dependent on last year’s primary 
balance. Indeed, it is not easy for the governments to implement enough measures in a 
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single year to dramatically change the fiscal policy stance. For instance, the more 
relevant budgetary spending items as the compensation of employees or social transfers 
are essentially little unchanged in the short-term. Therefore, the use of the primary 
balance lagged explanatory variable seems reasonable. Hence, making the primary 
balance a function of government debt, allows testing the following hypotheses: 
 
i) If θ = 0, the primary balance does not react to the level of public debt, a non-
Ricardian fiscal regime. 
ii) If θ > 0, the government tries to increase the primary balance in order to react 
to the existing stock of public debt and comply with the budget constraint, which 
could be seen as a sign of a Ricardian fiscal regime. 
 
Moreover, sustainability of public finances would require not only that θ is positive but 
also that such coefficient be sufficiently positive. 
 
Besides the previous simple fiscal rule for the primary balances, one may try to estimate 
also the following specification for the government debt ratio, 
 
 itititiit vbsb +++= −− 11 ϕγα , (3) 
 
where s and b are defined as before and now αi stands for the individual effects to be 
estimated for each country i, assuming also that the disturbances vit are independent 
across countries. Such a specification is essentially compatible with the standard budget 
deficit and debt dynamics formulation, even if we do not dwell here on that issue (see, 
for instance, Afonso (2005)). This allows putting forward the following testable ideas: 
 
i) The hypothesis of a Ricardian fiscal regime is not rejected when γ < 0, as most 
likely the government is using budget surpluses to reduce outstanding 
government debt. 




It is possible to see that (3) is almost an accounting identity departing from such 
equality for two reasons. Firstly the lagged debt coefficient varies over time being 
approximated by the difference between the interest rate and the economic growth rate. 
Secondly, deficit-debt adjustment related factors indeed disturb the linkage between 
deficit and debt, and they should then be part of the residual. 
 
Specifications (2) and (3) are standard fixed effects models, essentially linear regression 
models in which the intercept terms vary over the individual cross section units. The 
existence of differences between the several countries should then be taken into account 
by the autonomous term that may change from country to country, in each cross-section 
sample, in order to capture individual country characteristics. 
 
In the previous specifications there is nevertheless an implicit assumption that the 
underlying model is homogeneous, i. e. the coefficients are the same for all countries. 
As a matter of fact, one of the problems with panel data estimations, as, for example, 
mentioned by Haque, Pesaran and Sharma (2000), is the possibility that the real model 
might be heterogeneous, with different coefficients for the explanatory variables in the 
cross-section dimension. Assuming the same coefficients for all the countries, with the 
exception of the intercept, may give rise to non-linearity in the estimations, even if the 
relation between the variables is linear. An alternative estimator proposed by Pesaran 
and Smith (1995), the mean group estimator, is based on the separate estimation of the 
coefficients for each cross-section unit, through the least squares method, and then 
computing the arithmetic mean of those coefficients. Still, this alternative procedure 
does not allow for the hypothesis that some of the coefficients may indeed be similar for 
several countries. 
 
Alongside the problem mentioned above, and to circumvent the potential non-
stationarity problem arising from the time-series dimension of the data, empirical 
models in the literature are usually estimated with the first differences of the variables. 
Even so, in most cases this procedure does not fully solve the problem. The alternative 
of using variables in first differences also might not take into account the fact that there 
is a level relation between the government budget balance and the stock of outstanding 
public debt, through the present value borrowing constraint. 
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Moreover, in an autoregressive panel data model with exogenous variables with a fixed 
T dimension, estimation inconsistency might be a problem and the bias should not be 
ignored. To address such inconsistency problems an instrumental variables approach is 
adequate where the first differences of the variables are employed as their own 
instruments. This can be used both for the lagged dependent variable and also for the 
exogenous variables. However, in doing so, we give up any potential efficiency gains if 
an exogenous variable actually helps explaining the lagged endogenous variable. 
 
First-difference versions of equations (2) and (3) can be written as follows, respectively 
for the primary balance, 
 
 itititit ubss ∆+∆+∆=∆ −− 11 θδ , (4) 
 
and for the government debt, 
 
 itititit vbsb ∆+∆+∆=∆ −− 11 ϕγ , (5) 
 
where one now has ∆sit=sit-sit-1, ∆sit-1=sit-1-sit-2, ∆bit=bit-bit-1, and ∆bit-1=bit-1-bit-2.  
 
The above first differencing directly eliminates the individual effects (βi and αi) from 
the models. However, differencing introduces a correlation between the differenced 
lagged dependent variable (primary balance, and debt in this case) and the differenced 
error term, and the use of instruments is then required. For the previous two 
specifications, consistent estimates can be obtained using Two Stage Least Squares 
(2SLS) with instrumental variables correlated with ∆sit-1 (∆bit-1) and orthogonal to ∆uit 
(∆vit). Indeed, the lagged values sit-2 and bit-2, will be uncorrelated respectively with ∆uit 
and ∆vit, and can therefore be used as instrumental variables for the first differenced 
equations in (4) and (5).6 
 
One should notice that specifications (4) and (5) would imply a slightly different 
interpretation of parameters θ and γ. For instance, a positive θ would point to an 
                                                          
6 See, for instance, Bond (2002) and Verbeek (2003). 
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increasing speed in the change of the primary balance ratio when the speed of change in 
the debt-to-GDP ratio increases.  
 




In order to assess the possibility of Ricardian fiscal regimes for the EU-15, I use annual 
data spanning the years 1970-2003 for the primary budget balance as a percentage of 
GDP (excluding UMTS effects), and for the debt-to-GDP ratio. This gives a maximum 
of 34 years of annual observations for 15 countries. Of the 15 countries in the panel data 
set, 12 are currently in EMU – Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain – and 3 others have not 
adopted the euro – Denmark, Sweden and United Kingdom. The source of the data is 
the European Commission AMECO database. 
 
Table 2 presents summary descriptive statistics for the full sample (cross-sectional 
statistics are reported in the Appendix 1). For the sample period the debt-to-GDP ratio 
ranged from 4.6% for Luxembourg in 1991 to 137.9% for Belgium in 1993. On the 
other hand, the primary balance ratio ranged from -7.4% for Ireland in 1975 to 11.8% 
for Denmark in 1986. 
 
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics (full sample): 1970-2003 
 Mean Std dev Min Max Observations 
























Note: IR – Ireland; DK – Denmark; LU – Luxembourg; BE – Belgium. 
 
4.2. Debt and primary balance stylised evidence 
 
A first assessment of the data can be made in order to check the magnitude of the 
existing negative correlation between the primary budget balance ratio and the changes 
in the debt ratio. For instance, and according to the data, that correlation is around -0.80 
for Belgium, Spain, and the UK, and around -0.50 for Germany, Portugal, and Italy. On 
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the one hand, this hints at the possibility of Ricardian fiscal regimes in the EU-15, on 
the other hand it reveals different degrees of adherence to such a fiscal regime within 
the country sample. 
 
Figure 1 – Primary balance ratio and change in debt-to-GDP ratio (1971-2003) 
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Note: In the scatter diagrams I draw the fitted values of a 2nd order polynomial regression of the changes 
in the debt ratio on the primary balance ratio. 
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For a casual inspection of the underlying time series and to convey a visual impression 
of the correlation in the data, Figure 1 plots the changes in the debt-to-GDP ratio and 
primary balance ratios for a set of selected countries. Interestingly, a look at the scatter 
diagrams, where I draw a second order polynomial regression between the two 
variables, confirms the existence of a negative relationship. 
 
Since the institutional changes that occurred in the EU-15 in the 1990s may have had an 
effect on the prevalence of the fiscal regimes, alternative sub-sample periods are 
considered to take into account first, the signing of the European Union Treaty on 7 
February 1992 in Maastricht, with the setting up of the convergence criteria, and 
secondly, the adoption of the SGP framework on 13-14 December 1996 at the European 
Council in Dublin (formally adopted when the Amsterdam Treaty was signed on June 
1997).7  
 
The starting of the European and Monetary Union (EMU) on 1 January 1999, with the 
conversion of the national currencies into the euro, was also considered, as an additional 
illustration, given the limited availability of observations in this new regime. Moreover, 
this date also signals the moment when the implementation of the SGP – the fiscal pillar 
of EMU – actually started in practice. Table 3 reports the correlations for the 











                                                          
7 One has to be aware that the data sample breakdown for the Maastricht period might have different 
meanings for each country. Indeed, the dates of referendum approval varied among countries: 1992 for 
Belgium, France, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal; 1993 for Denmark, 
United Kingdom and Germany; 1994 for Austria, Finland and Sweden. 
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Table 3 – Correlation between the primary budget balance ratio and the change in 





European Union Treaty 
(Maastricht) 
Adoption of SGP 
(Dublin, Amsterdam) 
EMU 
  1971-03  1971-91  1992-03  1971-96  1997-03 1999-03 
Austria -0.77 -0.86 -0.63 -0.84 -0.11 -0.38 
Belgium -0.79 -0.70 -0.73 -0.70 0.19 0.20 
Denmark -0.72 -0.84 -0.33 -0.71 -0.59 -0.71 
Finland -0.70 -0.69 -0.72 -0.74 -0.06 -0.72 
France -0.88 -0.71 -0.93 -0.86 -0.96 -0.99 
Germany -0.54 -0.75 -0.52 -0.49 -0.75 -0.76 
Greece -0.50 -0.66 -0.74 -0.35 0.15 0.58 
Ireland -0.70 -0.66 -0.32 -0.66 -0.73 -0.88 
Italy -0.46 -0.20 -0.71 0.02 -0.29 -0.15 
Luxembourg -0.30 -0.34 -0.31 -0.41 0.45 0.44 
Netherlands -0.77 -0.42 -0.80 -0.55 -0.93 -0.94 
Portugal -0.52 -0.41 -0.72 -0.51 -0.58 -0.44 
Spain -0.78 -0.87 -0.86 -0.65 -0.70 -0.94 
Sweden -0.80 -0.89 -0.82 -0.81 -0.67 -0.73 
UK -0.80 -0.45 -0.98 -0.79 -0.96 -0.96 
 
Notes: Denmark, 1971-2003; France, 1977-2003; Luxembourg, 1970-1987, 1990-2003; 
Netherlands, 1975-2003; Portugal, 1973-2003. 
 
Even if these are simple correlations, one can nevertheless spot for the after-Maastricht 
period, for instance, some cases were the negative correlation between primary balances 
and debt changes was stronger (France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and UK), 
cases where the correlation broadly remained high (Belgium, Finland, Spain, and 
Sweden) and other cases where there was a weakening of the relationship (Denmark, 
Germany, Ireland, and Austria). 
 
4.3. Unit root tests 
 
This sub-section tests the relevant series for unit roots. The motivation behind panel 
data unit root tests is to increase the power of unit root tests by increasing the span of 
the data while minimising the risk of encountering structural breaks due to regime 
shifts.  
 
Supposing that the stochastic process, yit, is generated by the first-order autoregressive 
process described below in (6) for a panel sample,  
 
 TtNiXyy itititiit ,...,1   ,,...,1     ,1 ==++= − εδρ , (6) 
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where N is the total number of cross-sectional units observed over T time periods, i 
denotes the country, t indicates the period, Xit includes the exogenous variables, and the 
error process εit is distributed independently across sections. The null hypothesis of unit 
root is ρi=1 for all i. Moreover, if one assumes the existence of a common persistence 
coefficient across cross-sections, countries in this case, then the autoregressive 
coefficient is such that ρi=ρ for all i. On the other hand, one can allow ρi to vary across 
cross-sections.  
 
Several tests for unit roots within panel data have been proposed to address dynamic 
heterogeneous panels. Two alternative panel unit root tests are performed for our data 
sample in order to assess the existence of unit roots for the government debt and 
primary budget balance series. In the first category of tests, for instance, Levin, Lin, and 
Chu (2002) proposed a test based on heterogeneous panels with fixed effects where the 
null hypothesis assumes that there is a common unit root process and that ρi is identical 









1 εδβα , (7) 
 
assuming α=ρ-1. The null hypothesis of a unit root to be tested is then H0: α=0, against 
the alternative H1: a<0.8 
 
Instead, Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) proposed a test that allows for individual unit root 
processes so that ρi in (7) may vary across cross-sections, hence relaxing the assumption 
that ρ1=ρ2=…=ρN. The null hypothesis may in this case be written as H0: α=0, for all i. 














 ,..., 2,1for  ,0





, implying that some fraction of the  
                                                          
8 Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) mention that this type of test is particularly useful for panels of moderate 
size, between 10-250 cross-sections and 25-250 time series observations per cross section, therefore a 
category where this paper’s data sample fits. 
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individual processes are stationary. 9 
 
Table 4 reports the results of the aforementioned unit root tests for the debt-to-GDP and 
primary budget balance ratio to GDP series.  
 
Table 4 – Panel unit root results 
Common unit root (LLC) Individual unit root (IPS) Series Sample 
Statistic Probability N Statistic Probability N 
1970-2003 -2.11 0.018 463 0.19 0.574 463 
1970-1991 -1.05 0.148 292 3.01 1.000 292 
1992-2003 -5.74 0.000 180 -2.81 0.000 180 





1997-2003 -3.00 0.001 105 -0.43 0.335 105 
1970-2003 -1.41 0.080 479 -3.32 0.000 479 
1970-1991 -2.72 0.003 308 -3.09 0.000 308 
1992-2003 -3.45 0.000 180 -1.62 0.053 180 





1997-2003 -3.30 0.001 105 -0.31 0.371 105 
 
Notes: LLC – Levin, Lin and Chu. IPS – Im, Pesaran, and Shin. 
 
For the entire sample period it is possible to see that the tests reject the existence of a 
unit root at least at the 10 per cent significance level for the primary balance ratio. On 
the other hand, for the debt ratio series, while the common unit root test allows the 
rejection of the null hypothesis, the individual unit root test does not reject the unit root 
hypothesis.  
 
Additionally, for the primary balance, the null hypothesis of a unit root is also rejected, 
by both tests, for the sub-periods limited by the European Union Treaty (1970-1991 and 
1992-2003). For the sub-periods before and after the adoption of the SGP (1970-1996 
and 1997-2003), the unit root hypothesis is also mostly rejected even if one has to be 
aware of the more limited number of observations for the post-SGP period. 
 
Regarding the debt ratio series, it seems interesting to notice that the unit root 
hypothesis is never rejected for the sub-periods 1970-1991 and 1970-1996, but that it is 
                                                          
9 For instance, Phillips and Moon (2000) and Arellano and Honoré (2001) provide further discussions on 
panel unit root tests in panel data models.  
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mostly rejected for the post-Maastricht and post-SGP periods, respectively 1992-2003 
and 1997-2003. 
 
4.4. Estimation results 
 
The fixed effects model is a typical choice for macroeconomists and is generally more 
adequate than the random effects model. For instance, if the individual effects are 
somehow a substitute for non-specified variables, it is probable that each country-
specific effect is correlated with the other independent variables. Moreover, and since 
the country sample includes all the relevant countries, and not a random sample from a 
bigger set of countries the fixed effects model is a more obvious choice.  
 
Additionally, as noted namely by Greene (1997) and Judson and Owen (1997), when 
the individual observation sample (countries in our case) is picked from a larger 
population (for instance all the developed countries), it might be suitable to consider the 
specific constant terms as randomly distributed through the cross-section units. 
However, and even if the present country sample includes a small number of countries, 
it is sensible to admit that the EU-15 countries have similar specific characteristics, not 
shared by the other countries in the world. This is particularly true if one considers the 
fiscal rule-based framework underlying the Stability and Growth Pact, which has been 
progressively implemented since the late 1990s in the EU-15 countries. In this case, it 
would seem adequate to choose the fixed effects formalisation, even if it were not 
correct to generalise the results afterwards to the entire population, which is also not the 
purpose of the paper.   
 
Table 5 reports estimation results for the core specifications for the primary balance and 
for the debt ratios for the full sample period and all 15 countries. Alternative estimators 
are presented for equations (4) and (5), using 2SLS estimations with lagged values as 
instruments, on the full cross-sectional sample. The first two columns of reported 
estimated coefficients relate to the specification where the dependent variable is the 
primary balance, and the last two columns report estimated coefficients for the case 




Table 5 – 2SLS estimators for primary balance and debt ratios: 1970-2003 
 




Method Pooled Fixed effects Pooled Fixed effects 






































Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, 
and 1 percent level respectively.   
 
The hypothesis that primary balances react positively to government debt, i.e. θ>0, 
should not be rejected since the estimated coefficient is statistically different from zero 
and positive. In other words, the EU-15 governments seem to act in accordance with the 
existing stock of government debt, by increasing the primary budget surplus as a result 
of increases in the outstanding stock of government debt. This is consistent with the 
prevalence of a Ricardian fiscal regime, where fiscal policy adjusts to the intertemporal 
budget constraint, and the fiscal authorities respond in a “stabilising” manner by 
increasing primary balances when the debt ratio increases.10 
 
Additionally, and also according to the results of Table 5, when government debt is the 
dependent variable, EU-15 governments seem to use primary budget surpluses to reduce 
the debt-to-GDP ratio. This can be seen from the fact that we obtain a negative and 
statistically significant γ coefficient for the primary balance in the debt regressions. 
 
I estimated also the simple fiscal rule given by (4) by adding successively new yearly 
data from 1990 onwards, in order to assess the different magnitudes of the θ parameter 
through time. In other words, to see how the responsiveness of primary budget surplus 
to increases in the outstanding stock of government debt developed. The relevant pooled 
2SLS estimated coefficients (the fixed effects results were very similar), plotted in 
Figure 2, along with the respective probabilities, seem to indicate that the magnitude of 
                                                          
10 However, one should be aware that, for instance, measurement issues, and sizeable stock-flow 
adjustments, which can account for a relevant part of government debt accumulation, might blur such 
expected relationships as reported, for instance, by von Hagen and Wolff (2004). 
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primary surplus response was stable even if somewhat declining in the second half of 
the 1990s. 
 
Figure 2 – Magnitude and statistical significance of θ : responsiveness of primary 
budget surplus to debt (pooled 2SLS) 
 
 
Note: the horizontal bar denotes the 1% significance level. 
 
Next I split the study period into the pre- and post-Maastricht, using 1992 as the first 
year of the new EU fiscal framework, and then into the pre- and post-SGP periods using 
1997 as the splitting date, and re-estimated the specifications for the resulting four time 
intervals. This might be a way of controlling for common changes in fiscal regimes as 
response to common problems as, for instance, the need to make additional efforts in 
order to comply with the convergence criteria. Table 6 reports estimation results for the 
sub-periods before and after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, respectively 1970-









Table 6 – 2SLS estimators for primary balance and debt ratios, 
pre- and post-Maastricht: 1970-1991 and 1992-2003 
 




Method Pooled Fixed effects Pooled Fixed effects 






































   











































Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, 
and 1 percent level respectively. 
 
The responsiveness of primary balances to government debt remains positive and 
statistically significant, both for the pre- and post-Maastricht period. Moreover, the 
increase in primary balances still impact negatively on government debt in the two 
above-mentioned sub-periods. Again, this can be read as evidence of the existence of an 
overall Ricardian fiscal regime in the EU-15 throughout the full sample period. 
Interestingly, one may notice the increase in the magnitude of the estimated γ 
coefficients in the post-Maastricht period, vis-à-vis the pre-Maastricht period, implying 
somehow a stronger impact of primary balances on government debt. This could be read 
as a sign of increased efforts from the national governments in the second sub-period in 
order to comply with the European Union fiscal convergence criteria. 
 
Table 7 reports estimation results for the sub-periods before and after the drafting of the 
SGP, respectively 1970-1996 and 1997-2003. 
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Table 7 – 2SLS estimators for primary balance and debt ratios, 
pre- and post-SGP: 1970-1996 and 1997-2003 
 




Method Pooled Fixed effects Pooled Fixed effects 






































   











































Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, 
and 1 percent level respectively. 
 
The results reported in Table 7 can be summarised as follows. The introduction of the 
SGP framework did not seem to change substantially the overall fiscal regime in the 
EU-15, which seems to have remained a Ricardian one. In other words, both in the pre- 
and in the post-SGP sub-periods, improvements in primary balances were used to 
reduce government indebtedness (γ<0), and primary balances increased in order to react 
to the existing stock of government debt (θ>0). The estimated γ coefficients have 
broadly the same magnitude before and after the SGP implementation, synonym of a 
similar impact of primary balances on debt. On the other hand, primary balances do 
seem to react more to government debt in the post-SGP period, as indicated by the 





4.5. Alternative specifications 
 
4.5.1. Specific EMU and SGP dummies 
 
In order to further test the possibility of a shift in the fiscal regimes, and to avoid 
breaking up the data sample, I used specific dummy variables to signal the EMU and 
SPG sub-periods, respectively emuitD and 
sgp
itD . The dummy variable 
emu
itD takes the value 
one in the years of and after the approval of the Maastricht Treaty, and zero elsewhere 
(see footnote 7 for specific dates). The dummy variable sgpitD takes the value one in the 
euro area countries in 1997, and zero otherwise. Therefore, the two dummy variables 









referendum Maastricht ofyear    if 0,
referendum Maastricht ofyear   if ,1
t
t








area euro  if and 1997  if ,1 it
D sgpit . (9) 
 
Using the first difference versions of equations (2) and (3), the alternative testable 
specifications including an interaction term between b, s, and, for instance, the dummy 












ititit vsDsDbcb ∆+∆−+∆+∆+=∆ −−−−− 11211110 )1(γγϕ . (11) 
 
Similar specifications were also estimated for the SGP sub-periods, replacing then 
emu
itD 1− by 
sgp





Table 8 – 2SLS estimators for primary balance and debt ratios: full sample with 








Method Pooled Fixed effects Pooled Fixed effects 




































































Method Pooled Fixed effects Pooled Fixed effects 





























































Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, 
and 1 percent level respectively. 
 
It is possible to see that these alternatives specifications essentially confirm the results 
of the previous sub-section about the existence of Ricardian fiscal regimes in the EU. 
Indeed, primary balance improvements are used to reduce government indebtedness, as 
depicted by the respective negative estimated coefficients in the debt regressions. 
However, the primary balance coefficients in those regressions are only statistically 
significant for the post-EMU and post-SGP periods, which might signal some increased 
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efforts by the governments to improve the respective fiscal positions after EMU and 
after the setting up of the SGP. 
 
Moreover, the overall prevalence of fiscal Ricardian regimes cannot be discarded from 
the estimation results of the primary balance equations. Primary balances react 
positively and in a statistically significant way to government debt in the pre- and post-
EMU period. On the other hand, only the estimated coefficient for debt in the post-SGP 
sub-period is statistically significant in the primary balance regressions. 
 
One can also summarise the findings regarding the estimated θ coefficients, intended to 
model the response of primary balances to government debt, and where a positive value 
is a requirement for fiscal sustainability. The magnitude of such coefficient ranges from 
0.08 in the pre-SGP period, in the model with a specific SGP dummy variable and 
without cross effects, to 0.20 in the period 1997–2003, in the model with fixed effects. 
For the 18 above reported estimations, in Tables 5 to 8, the simple average value for θ is 
0.11, being statistically significant in 16 of the 18 cases. 
 
4.5.2. The relevance of the government indebtedness 
 
To assess how different levels of government indebtedness may impinge on the 
government’s responses within a Ricardian fiscal regime, I considered several 









DTH  ratiodebt  ,1DTH
itD . (12) 
 
Therefore, the fiscal rule used before for the primary balance can now be rewritten to 
include an interaction term between b and the dummy variable for the debt ratio 






ititit ubDwbDwsas ∆+∆−+∆+∆+=∆ −−−−− 11211110 )1(δ .(13) 
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I used several limit values for DTH, notably 50%, 60%, 65% and 70%. The estimation 
results with those thresholds for model (13) are reported in Table 9. Additionally, the 
results of using the average debt ratio of each country, instead of an overall limit, are 
also presented. 
 
Table 9 – IV fixed-effects panel estimations for primary balance, 1970-2003: 
alternative debt ratio thresholds 
 
 Debt ratio threshold (dth) 
 50% 60% 65% 70% Country 
average 











Debt ratio > dth 
 

































Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent 
level respectively. 
 
From Table 9 it is possible to conclude that the authorities seem to respond in a more 
Ricardian way when the debt ratio is above the selected thresholds. Indeed, the 
estimated coefficient for the debt variable is always higher in such circumstances. On 
the other hand, that coefficient is also higher for say a debt ratio of 70% than when the 
50% or 60% thresholds are used. The estimation results with the country averages for 
the debt ratio thresholds point again to a more Ricardian response of the governments in 
a situation of higher public indebtedness. 
 
Again from Table 9, one could mention for the case of the 70% threshold, that for 
instance, an acceleration of the change in the debt ratio of 5 percentage points would 
imply and acceleration in the improvement of the primary balance ratio of 0.615 
percentage points of GDP if the debt ratio was already above 70% or 0.395 percentage 
points of GDP otherwise. This implies that governments on average seem to respond in 




4.6. Electoral budget cycles 
 
An additional test can be made to see whether the responsiveness of primary budget 
balances to changes in the debt is hindered by the political cycle. In other words it might 
be relevant to see whether the electoral budget cycle diminishes the government 
adherence to a Ricardian fiscal regime. Indeed, faced with elections, governments might 
be less willing to deliver primary surpluses, which could be used to redeem debt, and 
more prompt to incur in more expansionary fiscal policies. Additionally, in an 
environment of quick government turnover, the authorities may be tempted to spend 
more before elections leaving a higher government indebtedness level for the new 
government since it probably does not share its spending priorities. 
 
The differences in government’s behaviour, which take into account the electoral cycle, 
are predicted and discussed by the literature on the relations between elections and 
fiscal performance, which can be traced back to Nordhaus (1975) and Hibbs (1997), 
respectively regarding opportunistic and partisan cycles.11 According to several studies, 
pre-electoral expansionary fiscal policies seem to be reported by the available data, with 
governments embarking sometimes in short sighted policies, characterised, for instance, 
by tax cuts before elections. 
 
In the context of this paper, the study of an eventual influence of the electoral cycle on 
the existence of Ricardian fiscal regimes can be studied by using the dummy 








in  parliament for the elections  were therecountry in  if ,1 ti
D ELit . (14) 
 
In order to test the relevance of the electoral cycle, the simple fiscal rule used before for 
the primary balance can now be amended to include an interaction term between b and 
the dummy variable for the elections, 
 
                                                          
11 For instance, Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Alesina and Roubini (1992), and Alesina, Roubini and Cohen 






ititit ubDwbDwsas ∆+∆−+∆+∆+=∆ −−− 121110 )1(δ . (15) 
 
The hypothesis to be tested is whether, faced with an election in the next period, t, 
governments choose to deliver in the pre-electoral period, t-1, a more expansionary 
fiscal policy, therefore allowing for a more mitigated response of the primary balance to 
recent increases in the government debt. In other words, if electoral budget cycles play a 
role in the government’s fiscal decisions, one would expect w1 to be smaller than w2, or 
eventually not even statistically significant, signalling then a less Ricardian fiscal 
regime under those circumstances. 
 
Data on parliamentary elections were collected for all the EU countries for the period 
1970-2003 (see Appendix 2). One has to bear in mind that for Portugal and Spain no 
democratic elections took place before 1975 and 1977 respectively, and therefore the 
election dummy assumes the value zero for all the previous years for these two 
countries. Additionally, for France I used the dates of the parliamentary elections 
instead of the presidential ones, since the latter followed in the past a longer political 
cycle resulting in a smaller number of observations. Table 10 reports the results of the 
estimation of (14) for the full sample period.  
 
Table 10 – 2SLS estimators for primary balance: 






Method Pooled Fixed effects 

































Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically significant at 
the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. 
 
From the results reported with the election interaction dummy, it is possible to see that 
primary balances react positively and in a statistically significant way to government 
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debt, when there are no parliamentary elections in the next period, but this is not the 
case if there are elections. Indeed, only the estimated coefficient for debt in the no-
elections sub-sample is statistically significant in the primary balance regressions 
(having also a higher magnitude). This could imply that authorities’ adherence a 
Ricardian fiscal regime depends in some way on the electoral cycle. 
 
Therefore, more expansionary fiscal policies are somehow related to political elections, 
a result also mentioned, for instance, by Buti and van den Noord (2003) for the euro 
area in the period 1999-2002. Interestingly, Tujula and Wolswijk (2004) also report that 
for the EU-15 countries fiscal balances deteriorated in general elections years during the 
period 1970-2002. 
 
Additionally, the results for the EMU and SGP sub-samples, allowing for the interaction 
of the election dummy, are presented in Table 11. 
 
Again, and after taking into account the EMU and SGP sub-samples, it is possible to 
observe that when an election takes place governments’ reactions seem to be less in line 
with a fiscal Ricardian regime. Notice that in such cases, none of the estimated 























Method Pooled Fixed effects Pooled Fixed effects 






























































Method Pooled Fixed effects Pooled Fixed effects 


























































Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, 




Whether fiscal authorities adhere to a Ricardian or to a non-Ricardian fiscal regime 
might have practical implications notably as to additional challenges posed, for 
instance, to the monetary authorities, and in terms of the sustainability of public 
finances. All in all, the theoretical assumptions required for the existence of non-
Ricardian regimes, where fiscal policy could actively determine the price level seem 
rather problematic to agree with, being the possibility of Ricardian fiscal regimes more 
consensual in the literature. 
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In this paper I used a panel data set to test the existence of Ricardian fiscal regimes in 
the EU-15 countries. The results for the period 1970-2003 show that the EU-15 
governments do have a tendency to use the primary budget surplus to reduce the debt-
to-GDP ratio, synonym of a fiscal Ricardian regime. This response seems to be higher 
the higher is the level of government indebtedness. On the other hand, governments also 
seem to improve the primary budget balance as a result of increases in the outstanding 
stock of government debt. This new set of results for the EU-15 is consistent with the 
sparse already available related empirical evidence. 
 
The above mentioned overall results reported in the paper, in line with the prevalence of 
Ricardian fiscal regimes, also hold for four different sub-periods: pre- and post-
Maastricht, and pre- and post-SGP period. Some changes in the magnitude of the 
estimated coefficients are also found for the post-SGP period. These results seem to be 
robust to alternative specifications, either by breaking up the sample or by using 
specific EMU and SGP dummy variables. Moreover, one may also mention that simple 
correlation analysis hints at the possibility that the degree of responsiveness of fiscal 
authorities to fiscal problems varies across countries and across the aforementioned data 
sample sub-periods. 
 
Additionally, when allowing for the interaction between fiscal developments and the 
electoral budget cycle the evidence seems to confirm that the adherence to a Ricardian 
fiscal regime is more mitigated in election times. Indeed, in the simple fiscal rule used 
for the primary balance, this variable reacts less to government debt when an election 
occurs. In other words, one cannot discard the idea that governments try somehow to 
use fiscal policy in order to increase their chances for a positive electoral outcome. This 









Appendix 1 – Cross-sectional descriptive statistics 
 
Table A2.1 – Primary balance ratio (1970-2003) 
 
 Mean Std dev Min Max Observations 
Austria 0.9 1.4 -2.0 3.7 34 
Belgium 1.8 3.8 -7.4 6.9 34 
Denmark 4.8 3.1 -2.6 11.8 33 
Finland 4.5 3.0 -3.0 10.0 34 
France 0.2 1.1 -2.5 1.9 34 
Germany 0.3 1.4 -4.3 2.8 34 
Greece -0.1 4.0 -6.7 6.6 34 
Ireland 0.6 3.9 -7.4 6.4 34 
Italy -0.7 3.7 -6.9 6.7 34 
Luxembourg 3.2 2.0 -1.9 7.2 32 
Netherlands 1.9 1.6 -1.0 5.3 34 
Portugal -0.3 2.5 -5.3 3.8 34 
Spain -0.2 2.0 -4.4 2.9 34 
Sweden 4.1 3.8 -5.6 10.4 34 
UK 1.3 2.5 -4.8 6.7 34 
Full sample 1.5 3.3 -7.4 11.8 507 
  Source: EC AMECO database. 
Table A2.2 – Debt ratio (1970-2003) 
 
 Mean Std dev Min Max Observations 
Austria 47.6 18.3 17.0 69.2 34 
Belgium 102.8 28.8 57.9 137.9 34 
Denmark 47.0 22.9 5.8 78.0 33 
Finland 25.7 18.6 6.2 58.0 34 
France 39.9 15.0 19.8 63.3 27 
Germany 40.6 14.8 18.0 64.2 34 
Greece 62.5 36.8 17.5 111.3 34 
Ireland 70.6 24.7 32.3 114.2 34 
Italy 84.9 27.8 37.9 124.8 34 
Luxembourg 10.4 5.1 4.6 23.2 34 
Netherlands 62.4 13.8 40.0 79.3 29 
Portugal 48.6 14.9 15.0 64.3 31 
Spain 37.7 20.0 12.1 68.1 34 
Sweden 49.4 16.5 24.6 73.9 34 
UK 51.5 11.0 34.0 78.7 34 
Full sample 52.4 30.3 4.6 137.9 492 







Appendix 2 – Parliamentary election dates 
 
 BE DK DE GR ES FR IR IT LU NL AU PT FI SW UK 
1970 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
1971 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
1972 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
1973 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1974 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1975 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
1976 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1977 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1978 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1979 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
1980 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1981 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1982 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1983 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
1984 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1985 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1986 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
1987 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
1988 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1989 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1990 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1991 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1993 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1994 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
1995 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
1996 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1997 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1998 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1999 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
2000 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2001 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2002 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 
2003 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
 
Notes: the electoral dummy variable assumes a value of one when there is a parliamentary election. The 
data on election dates was obtained from the following two sources:  
http://www.idea.int/vt/total_number_of_elections.cfm and http://electionresources.org/. 
BE – Belgium; DK – Denmark; DE – Germany; GR – Greece; ES – Spain; FR – France; IR – Ireland; IT – 
Italy; LU – Luxembourg; NL – Netherlands; AU – Austria; PT – Portugal; FI –Finland; SW – Sweden; UK 
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